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Qaeda is guided by a religious ideology in pursuit of apocalyptically guided objectives.
These "millenarian" concepts portrayed by Al Qaeda make them unique when compared to other terrorist organizations. This study will focus on what makes Al Qaeda"s movement millenarian or messianic in nature and then describe the new conditions facing the United States today as a result of having a fanatical actor as Al Qaeda as a belligerent. The analysis will use Norman Cohn"s theory of millenarianism and that of other scholars like Dr. James Rinehart who have studied such movements.
Finally, the paper provides a road map or strategy that the US could use to prosecute a war against such an actor.
AL QAEDA"S MILLENARIAN DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Throughout the 20 th century terrorist groups normally acted against a state entity in order to advance their interests. Normally, these interests are associated with territorial goals or aspirations for self-determination. Organizations such as Al Qaeda, whose relentless pursuit of their extreme and religiously guided political objectives have created a new playing field that has changed the rules of terrorism today. An organization like Al Qaeda brings a fanatical player to the mix which has challenged and broadened the current notion of terrorism today. The United States now faces a terrorist organization like one that has never been seen before and it must adapt its policies to properly address this new threat.
This study will first discuss the aspects of what we label classical terrorism and then address why Al Qaeda is different from other terrorist organizations. The study of millenarian concepts as posited by Norman Cohn and James Rinehart will help establish the uniqueness of Al Qaeda in relation to other groups. Their analysis will then lead to a discussion of fanaticism and the dangers of a fanatical actor within a millenarian or messianic movement. The study identifies America"s present tenets vis-à-vis terrorism and introduces three concepts that must be incorporated in order to counter this new and unique form of terrorism. First, America has to give a clear purpose of the effort and create a war psychology at home. Second, policy makers have to re-define the notion of self determination abroad. Finally, America must redefine the notion of victory in this war. The days of unconditional victories normally associated with state-on-state conflicts are over. Instead, the state must identify a viable objective and what can happen if that objective is not met.
Classic Terrorism
In a 1999 report the Department of State (DOS) identified seven countries that support terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan) and 28
terrorist organizations worldwide, to include Al Qaeda. 1 The report identifies terrorism as a "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience." Classic terrorists are more willing to negotiate to survive and advance their interests via a political process and 2) Classic terrorists, once in power, have shown that they are more willing to compromise their principles in order to serve more pragmatic interests.
In essence, classic terrorist movements share common objectives that center on selfdetermination, control of territory, and the implementation of their ideology through a political process.
Most terrorist groups have nationalistic aspirations and some even have political wings that are part of the specific country"s political process. thousand square kilometer area of Colombia to be declared a demilitarized zone (DMZ).
The FARC then moved into the DMZ, an area the size of Switzerland, and were free from military attack. The Colombian government, whether they agreed with the FARC or not, understood their goals and used negotiations to secure concessions in exchange for territory. 3 The fact that negotiations take place obviously means that the government and the terrorists are willing to make concessions. Spain and England have both negotiated with ETA and the IRA respectively in order to curb violence. Negotiations thus offer the state a way to end the violence and the terrorists see a way to advance their interests.
Peter Neumann from Kings College in London states that "the first and most obvious question for any government considering negotiations is whether the terrorist it faces can make good negotiating partners." 4 He goes on to add that states must draw a distinction between nihilistic terrorists who have absolute or even apocalyptic goals and for whom violence has become a perverted form of self-realization and more traditional terrorists, who are believed to be instrumental or political in their aspirations and so have the potential to become constructive interlocutors.
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The lesson here is that traditional terrorists may concede if the terms offered by the state are perceived to meet some of their demands. That is, they are willing to compromise some of their values and goals in order to move their interests forward.
This aspect has also been true of secular movements with millenarian characteristics that promise deliverance only after undertaking a violent struggle.
A group that displayed the classic messianic like principles seen in more religiously guided groups like Al Qaeda is Aum Shinrikyo. The group dispersed sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in March of 1995 in the hopes of starting a cataclysmic event that would bring on a war between the US and Japan. Like other terrorist groups, they hoped that violence would achieve their objectives. Their objectives were derived from religious or apocalyptic beliefs just like Al Qaeda.
Aum followers believed that the United States would attack Japan with nuclear weapons by 1996 and that they alone would survive the event. Shoko Asahara, the cult"s leader, believed in this apocalyptic event and was considered by some as the basis for their decision to help usher in this war by using sarin in Tokyo. Moreover Asahara, believed that the "United States and the West were spreading rampant materialism and internationalism, which he saw as the root of Japan"s problems." 6 The cult seems to be different than the classical terrorist organization in the sense that their objectives can be characterized as extremely fanatical and unattainable. However, the difference that makes Aum Shinrikyo like many other terrorist organizations in the classical sense, is that they tried to change their stance in order to be accepted by the same society they injured.
As stated earlier, many terrorist groups in the list of 28 have created political factions in order to assimilate themselves legitimately into the electoral process. Many other terrorist organizations have laid down their arms to take part in the electoral process and some have even made a point to separate their political wings from their military wings in order to make themselves more legitimate.
By 1999, Aum Shinrikyo"s group leaders had apologized in public to the Japanese people for the attack in the hopes of establishing some relevance and reassociation with society. This public apology served two purposes. First, Aum members may have considered it more important to be accepted by Japanese society again in order to be a part of the political process. Second, it may be that their core message of apocalyptic doom does not have the mass appeal needed by millenarian movements to support a viable base of followers. The result is that the message has to be diluted to keep attracting more followers who may not be apt to follow the more radical views. As the message is diluted, the apocalyptic or millenarian aspects of the message are lost. Could Al Qaeda face a similar process in the future?
The second aspect of classical terrorism is that these movements will bend their principles once they are in power. Secular millenarian movements such as the early Bolsheviks promised the reward of an egalitarian society that would be free from want. An important factor that contributes to such a social healing is the boundless utopian-seeking quality of millenarian beliefs. Such beliefs allow the potential for ideological foundations to be shaped into a call for complete, unqualified and, if necessary, violent, total societal change that will seemingly rectify all social maladies. 14 Al Qaeda now embodies the essence of a broader and international, radical
Islamic movement whose far reaching political objectives derive from religious principles. "Hence, in the absence of a proper political strategy, politics is identified with religion, and activism is seen as a religious duty." 15 In the end, they want to establish a Caliphate and unite all Muslim countries under one system of governance. " [Al Qaeda] believes that it is entrusted with an internal mission to lead the world into the apocalypse by making use of conflicts between religions and civilization." 16 Using Dr.
Rinehart"s two dimensions of source of ideology and scope, it is evident that Al Qaeda"s objectives are different and that its apocalyptic flavor is exactly what makes them a millenarian movement of extreme danger.
The Millenarian Link
Norman Cohn describes the tenets of millenarian movements as seeing salvation as:
Collective, in the sense that it is to be enjoyed by the faithful as a collectivity; Terrestrial, in the sense that it is to be realized on this earth Imminent, in the sense that it is to come both soon and suddenly; Total, in the sense that it is to transform life on earth; Miraculous, in the sense that it is to be accomplished by, or with the help of supernatural agencies. 17 Cohn also describes millenarian movements as having unprecedented goals and who see their struggle "not as a struggle for specific, limited objectives, but as an event of unique importance, different in kind from all other struggles known to history, a cataclysm from which the world is to emerge totally transformed and redeemed." [Islam] ordained by God for all human beings, whether they be rulers or ruled, black or white, poor or rich, ignorant or learned. Its law is uniform for all and all human beings are equally responsible within it…. denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction; and 4) spreading democracy. 30 The aforementioned policy seems to point the country in the right direction;
however, this study argues that America must focus on the following three concepts in order to fight a protracted war against radical millenarian Islamists.
Concept 1: Create the War Psychology with Americans
The American people must know that they are in a war for national survival.
During World War II, the US identified the unconditional surrender of Japan and The announcement of an end to combat operations emphasized the notion of an exit strategy and gave the average American false hope that the conflict in Iraq was over. The US government must consider the notion, when fighting a millenarian terrorist group like Al Qaeda, of preparing their citizenry for realistic end states rather than short term and unrealistic exit strategies. A Rand study on this put it best by stating that
The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed. The real question for the United States should not be how soon it can leave, but rather how fast and how much to share power with Iraqis and the international community while retaining enough power to oversee an enduring transition to democracy and stability. 31 America must establish this war psychology and clearly delineate its objective in an overt manner for the following reasons. First, its adversary must know the level of its resolve. Second, the domestic population must have a clear understanding of the endeavor or effort in front of them and more importantly, what is at stake. Finally, the international community must clearly understand how the US will accomplish its goals as the conflict against Al Qaeda will be international in nature.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush identified the destruction of Al Qaeda as the objective and warned that any nation harboring the terrorist organization within their borders would be considered a belligerent. As Clausewitz would have put it, President Bush had made the destruction of Al Qaeda a "political objective" and committed the nation to armed conflict or war. 32 Clausewitz sees this as pivotal by saying "when whole communities go to war-whole peoples and especially civilized peoples-the reason always lies in some political situation, and the decision is always due to some political object. War therefore, is an act of policy." 33 Once the purpose or object is clear, the nation must address how it will do it and what is at stake. should we lose the free countries of Europe and Asia then we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take the defense measures which might bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we couldn"t recognize it as American any longer. 35 America"s losses in World War II were low compared to European countries; however, rest assured that the loss of 450 thousand dead Americans in four years showed a level of commitment by a united America that had never been seen before or since.
The 9/11 attack was the worst attack faced by America in terms of death toll and damage. Moreover, this study has established that Al Qaeda is not likely to show any restraint and will use any weapon to attack Americans at home. The country faces a peril like never seen before yet the country, for the most part, does not have the necessary war psychology for such an effort.
As this study has stated, Al Qaeda will pursue even more spectacular attacks and show no restraint vis-à-vis type of weapons and who is targeted. The US government must make this very clear to the American people. The US government, like the Truman administration did before, has to make it clear that the nation is in a contest for national survival. Unfortunately, it may take more spectacular attacks here at home to make this point. One of the main tenets of democracy is majority rule with minority rights. This notion of democracy can exist when there is trust that the government will provide security for all and more importantly, rule in a manner that allows the minority some influences or share of power. Moreover, all governed must accept that, from time to time, they may be forced to accept decisions that may not be in their best interest.
America should broaden its notion of self determination beyond that of a democratic government and instead promote a plan of governance based on the ..we must reach the conclusion that the Islamic state from its inception had a fragile structure. It failed to dissolve tribes; instead, it adapted to them the structure of the new state. Viewed from this angle, the Islamic umma can be seen as a super tribe that evolved from a tribal federation. It was not a homogeneous community. This federation was susceptible to fragmentation when its underpinnings were weakened….the divisive forces of the body politic in early Islam were both tribal and ethnic. 37 Qutb and Al Qaeda"s notion of this the entire Muslim community as a "super tribe" is flawed because it fails to identify the differences that exist today due to tribal influences. Al Qaeda"s myopic view of an umma that can be united as a "super tribe"
will help undermine their very cause as it will fail to transcend their differences.
Likewise, America must be cautious in its use of the institution of western democracy as a method of transcending these very same differences. As noted earlier, this study Although, there is danger in working with despotic regimes as their downfall can create long term problems, the reality is that there are places in the world where democracy does not work very well.
The risk of dealing directly with autonomous tribes at the expense of establishing strong democratic and pluralistic institutions is that the former structure may still have the underlying conditions for conflict without a central government to adjudicate or arbitrate their differences. Saddam Hussein and the secular Ba"ath party succeeded in running a state by keeping tribal groups down via a ruthless security apparatus. He brutally quelled insurrections and set up a repressive system of governance that limited any sectarian problems. Now, without a strong central government, the result may be smaller conflicts which can still be used by Al Qaeda to pit one group against the other.
However, as America enters into the 9 th year of war, it can be argued that the pursuit of establishing strong democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan has not succeeded and the risk of this option may be worth the effort.
This risk of working with tribes or sects first rather than charging immediately to democracy can be mitigated by working in an incremental manner. For example, America"s process to go from a loose confederation to a nation united by a constitution was difficult and worked only when issues such as slavery were ignored to be dealt with later. What is to say that such a process in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be done incrementally also? First, it may be prudent to use the established tribal system of governance with the hope that it leads to a more united country in the future. In the end, America wants friendly governments that are supported by their people and not necessarily weak democratic governments with elusive mandates that are not trusted by their own populace.
The notion of spreading democracy should be a goal based on the specific region"s socio-political make up, history, and religious beliefs. The American strategic message should emphasize a process of self-determination that will one day lead to a democratic institution. The US should establish democratic institutions as a bench mark but apply an incremental process given the area of the world.
Concept 3: America Must Re-Define What Victory Will Looks Like
America must abandon the notion of complete victory against Al Qaeda and focus more on shaping the conditions that will effectively counter their apocalyptic message. There will be no Al Qaeda delegates signing a declaration of unconditional surrender on the deck of an American battle ship as was done by the Japanese. As was posited in the first concept, America is in a long term effort against Al Qaeda and whatever organizations will follow them afterwards. The fight against apocalyptic and radical Islam will be a long term effort. As such, America may need to consider success as being the absence of spectacular attacks rather than the elusive pursuit of the total destruction of Al Qaeda. To accomplish this, America must do two things.
First, America must continue to prosecute the kinetic fight wherever Al Qaeda masses for training or attacks. That is, it must aggressively pursue the enemy in areas of the world where they train and organize to fight. The notion that there will always be someone who needs to be killed is sound; however, as many American commanders have stated already, America cannot kill its way to victory. Second, America must build a permanent and comprehensive, whole of government, effort around the globe with the mission of identifying Al Qaeda organizational support links and creating programs that will help dilute Al Qaeda"s millenarian message that the Muslim community is threatened.
The first part has been done with extreme effectiveness. Most experts will agree that Al Qaeda is unable to plan and coordinate attacks as it did prior to 9-11.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri are now living like fugitives in caves rather than like presidents or military commanders in compounds in Afghanistan.
Other Al Qaeda leaders have been killed or captured, and the organization"s ability to communicate globally and to finance major operations has been significantly reduced. 38 Furthermore, the absence of spectacular attacks on the US mainland proves that Al Qaeda has been unable to organize effective follow-on attacks of the magnitude of 9-11. America needs to continue this effort but must complement it with a world wide effort of mitigating the conditions that facilitate the growth and appeal of the terrorist organization. Both the kinetic and non-kinetic fights, as described above, will be a long term effort. By long term, this study suggests that Rinehart"s notion of "new terrorism" will be a permanent condition faced by America and other states around the world. Americans have to accept that they will be under war conditions for the foreseeable future. The notion of victory must be re-defined as a process of executing the aforementioned kinetic and non-kinetic effort efficiently. Victory will now be considered as episodic time periods in between major attacks against the homeland. America must learn from each attack or failed attack and continuously adjust its kinetic and non-kinetic response apparatus to meet the evolving enemy.
Conclusion
Al Qaeda was at war with America long before America realized it. Like Qutb, Al infighting. As such, it can be argued that Al Qaeda"s unique message of a Caliphate resonates very well on paper but will be hard to execute.
The concepts identified by this study are more inclined to help America fight a war of attrition and to wait out the eventual demise or more than likely, the transformation of Al Qaeda to something less sinister. Establishing the war psychology at home, changing our notion of self determination abroad, and re-defining victory will help guide America to navigate the dangerous waters for the next 100 or so years.
Rinehart"s notion of "new terrorism" represents a new playing field which has forever altered the rules of conflict. The United States must adapt to fight a protracted war that it may never win, but one that it cannot lose. Endnotes
